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Abstract
A growing body of evidence suggests that short-term memory does not only
store the identity of recently experienced stimuli, but also information about
when they were presented. This representation of ‘what’ happened ‘when’
constitutes a neural timeline of recent past. Behavioral results suggest that
people can sequentially access memories for the recent past, as if they were
stored along a timeline to which attention is sequentially directed. In the
short-term judgment of recency (JOR) task, the time to choose between two
probe items depends on the recency of the more recent probe but not on
the recency of the more remote probe. This pattern of results suggests a
backward self-terminating search model. We review recent neural evidence
from the macaque lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) (Tiganj, Cromer, Roy,
Miller, & Howard, in press) and behavioral evidence from human JOR task
(Singh & Howard, 2017) bearing on this question. Notably, both lines of ev-
idence suggest that the timeline is logarithmically compressed as predicted
by Weber-Fechner scaling. Taken together, these findings provide an inte-
grative perspective on temporal organization and neural underpinnings of
short-term memory.
Introduction
Working memory is a term used to describe our ability to maintain information in an
activated state. In typical working memory tasks, a relatively small amount of information
is presented; after a few seconds, memory for the studied information is tested. Previ-
ous work has proposed stable persistent firing as a mechanism for maintaining memory
of the stimulus identity across a temporal delay (Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Egorov, Hamam,
Fransén, Hasselmo, & Alonso, 2002; Amit & Brunel, 1997; Compte, Brunel, Goldman-
Rakic, & Wang, 2000; Durstewitz, Seamans, & Sejnowski, 2000; Chaudhuri & Fiete, 2016;
*These authors contributed equally to this work.
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Lundqvist, Herman, & Lansner, 2011; Mongillo, Barak, & Tsodyks, 2008; Sandberg, Teg-
nér, & Lansner, 2003). According to this view, the to-be-remembered information triggers a
subset of neurons that remain active until the information is no longer needed. The identity
of the stimulus is reflected in the subset of neurons that are activated. By examining which
neurons are active at the end of the delay, one can infer what stimulus was presented at the
beginning of the delay and use that information to correctly respond to the memory test.
In contrast to the classical view that information is maintained in working memory via
a static code, a growing body of evidence suggests that working memory representations
are dynamic rather than static, moving along trajectory during the delay interval (Stokes,
2015; Spaak, Watanabe, Funahashi, & Stokes, 2017). This observation is anticipated by
recurrent neural network models in which an external stimulus can triggers a sequence of
internal neural states (Buonomano & Maass, 2009; Maass, Natschläger, & Markram, 2002;
White, Lee, & Sompolinsky, 2004). For instance, in echo state networks (Jaeger & Haas,
2004), an external stimulus provides input to a random connectivity matrix. The recurrent
connectivity matrix induces a potentially complex “reservoir” of states that can be accessed
some time after a stimulus. A recurrent network is a reservoir if the output, up to some
tolerance, is a function of the input sequence up to some temporal window. However, the
response of a particular unit triggered by a stimulus need not be unimodal in time nor a
function only of one stimulus. Reservoir computing is powerful, but the complexity of the
dynamics that can result from recurrent connections means that successfully decoding the
sequence of past events that triggered a particular network state be challenging (Maass et
al., 2002).
In this paper, we review evidence that suggests working memory maintenance could be
understood as intermediate between these two approaches. Following previous theoretical
(Shankar & Howard, 2012, 2013) and cognitive modeling (Howard, Shankar, Aue, & Criss,
2015) work, we consider the possibility that working memory maintenance produces a con-
junctive code for what stimulus happened when in the past. Neurons participating in this
representation would fire when a particular stimulus feature was experienced a certain time
in the past. The “temporal receptive fields” of these predicted neurons are compact. Crit-
ically, temporal receptive fields are scale-invariant; neurons with temporal receptive fields
further in the past also show an increase in their spread such that the width of their firing
field goes up linearly with the time at which they peak. This property results in a loga-
rithmic compression of the temporal dimension, enabling a natural account of behavioral
effects in a range of memory paradigms (Howard et al., 2015).
Like reservoir computing approaches, this scale-invariant representation of the past gives
rise to a dynamically-changing state during working memory maintenance as events fade
into the past. Indeed, the mathematical implementation of this approach meets the formal
definition of a liquid state machine (Shankar & Howard, 2013). However, unlike a more
general reservoir computing models, this compressed representation is linear. This property
enables straightforward decoding of what happened when in the past.
In this paper we review two threads of evidence that provide support for this hypothe-
sis. First, we review recent evidence from working memory tasks with non-human primates
(Tiganj, Cromer, et al., in press). This evidence demonstrates that neurons in lateral
prefrontal cortex (lPFC) show conjunctive receptive fields for what happened when in a
working memory maintenance task. As predicted by this approach, the neurons in this
WORKING MEMORY ALONG A LOGARITHMIC TIMELINE 3
task have simple temporal receptive fields that systematically spread out as the delay un-
folds. The form of the spread is consistent with logarithmic compression of the temporal
dimension. Second, we review recent behavioral evidence from the short-term judgment of
recency (JOR) task in humans (Singh & Howard, 2017). After rapid presentation of a list of
stimuli, participants can determine which of the probes was experienced more recently. It
is difficult to account for this ability if participants needed to learn a new decoder for every
possible probe at every possible recency. Moreover, a careful examination of the amount
of time to make a successful judgment suggests that participants scan along their memory,
terminating the search when a probe is identified (Hacker, 1980; Hockley, 1984; Muter,
1979; McElree & Dosher, 1993). Recent evidence shows that the time to scan for a probe
goes up sublinearly, approximately with the log of the probe’s recency, as predicted by this
approach (Singh & Howard, 2017).
Neurophysiological evidence for time as a supported, compressed dimension
Models with recurrent neural networks can maintain information about preceding stimuli
(Buonomano & Merzenich, 1995; Maass et al., 2002; Buonomano & Maass, 2009; White et
al., 2004). The recurrent dynamics and nonlinearities in the activation function can give rise
to neurons with a variety of complex responses. Such responses include stable persistent
firing and temporally modulated transient activity of various forms including decaying,
growing, single- and multi-peak responses. In addition, the general form of dynamics in
reservoir computing can produce a variety of responses that mix the stimulus identity and
the elapsed time in a highly nonlinear fashion. This type of activity is refereed as switching
selectivity, and includes neurons that switch between preferred stimuli during the delay
interval (Chaisangmongkon, Swaminathan, Freedman, & Wang, 2017). Because of the
complexity of the internal dynamics of the recurrent neural network, information about the
elapsed time is not directly readable from the firing rate. Rather it must be decoded, which
can be potentially challenging.
It has been long argued that brain represents sensory and motor continuous variables
with a population code dominated by neurons that have unimodal tuning curves (Pouget,
Dayan, & Zemel, 2000; Dayan & Abbott, 2001). These variables include for instance visual
orientation (Hubel & Wiesel, 1968), sound frequency (Goldstein Jr & Abeles, 1975) and
direction of motion (Georgopoulos, Kalaska, Caminiti, & Massey, 1982). With this type
of coding different sensory and motor variables are represented as supported dimension.
Elapsed time could be represented in an analogous way with neurons that have unimodal
receptive fields tuned to a particular time in the past. A sequence of such neurons with
receptive fields distributed along the temporal axis would constitute a representation of
elapsed time that can be decoded using the same mechanisms that can be applied to decode
sensory variables.
A number of studies have reported time cells that activate sequentially, each for a
circumscribed period of time (Pastalkova, Itskov, Amarasingham, & Buzsaki, 2008; Mac-
Donald, Lepage, Eden, & Eichenbaum, 2011). It has been argued that time cells could
play an important role in timing and memory (MacDonald, Fortin, Sakata, & Meck, 2014;
Howard et al., 2014; Eichenbaum, 2014; Howard & Eichenbaum, 2015; Eichenbaum, 2013).
After being initially observed in hippocampus, time cells have subsequently been observed
in entorhinal cortex (Kraus et al., 2015), medial prefrontal cortex (Tiganj, Kim, Jung, &
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Howard, in press; Bolkan et al., 2017) and striatum (Jin, Fujii, & Graybiel, 2009; Mello,
Soares, & Paton, 2015; Akhlaghpour et al., 2016). If this temporal code is logarithmically-
compressed, complying with the Weber-Fechner law, then this predicts two properties of
time cells that have been observed. First, time fields later in the sequence should be more
broad (i.e., less precise) than those earlier in the sequence. Second, there should be more
neurons with time fields early in the delay and fewer neurons representing times further in
the past. Both of these properties have been observed (e.g., Howard et al., 2014; Kraus et
al., 2015; Jin et al., 2009; Mello et al., 2015). A recent study (Tiganj, Cromer, et al., in
press) extends this work by confirming another property predicted for time cells—that stim-
ulus identity is encoded conjunctively with the time elapsed since the stimulus presentation
(see also MacDonald, Carrow, Place, & Eichenbaum, 2013; Terada, Sakurai, Nakahara, &
Fujisawa, 2017).
Conjunctive coding of what and when on a logarithmically-compressed temporal
scale in a working memory task
This hypothesis was recently tested (Tiganj, Cromer, et al., in press) using data from
an earlier report (Cromer, Roy, & Miller, 2010). The experimental paradigm was a delayed
match to category task. In this task a sample stimulus was presented for 500 ms followed
by a 1500 ms delay interval and then by a test stimulus. The sample stimuli were divided
into two category sets based on visual similarity, animals and cars. The animals category
set consisted of two categories, dog images and cat images. The car category set consisted
of sports cars and sedan cars.
Even though this task did not require animals to maintain temporal information, the
neurons active during the delay fired consistently only during a circumscribed period of the
delay (Figure 1a), leading to a sequence of time cells. Even in the absence of a specific task
demand, this population conveyed information about the time at which the stimulus was
experienced. These stimulus-specific time cells show the same qualitative properties as the
time cells recorded from other studies: the width of the temporal tuning curves increased
with and the number density of time cells decreased with the passage of time (Tiganj,
Cromer, et al., in press).
Critically, different kinds of sample stimulus triggered distinct but overlapping sequences
of time cells (compare three columns of Fig. 1a). Time cells preferentially tuned to a
particular category were more likely to fire for visually similar stimuli (those from the
same category set) than to visually dissimilar stimuli (those from a different category set),
Figure 1a.
The decreasing temporal accuracy in these sequentially-activated stimulus-specific time
cells is consistent with the hypothesis that the temporal axis is logarithmically-compressed.
Figure 1b shows the heatmaps plotted against the logarithm of time, the width and the
density of the temporal tuning curves is roughly constant as function of position within the
sequence.
Although these results are consistent with the predictions of a logarithmically-compressed
representation of what happened when, they rule out many forms of a more general dynamic
working memory. For instance, a general reservoir computing model could have easily gen-
erated much more complex receptive fields, with neurons showing complex receptive fields in
time or responding to different stimuli at different times. These were not observed (Tiganj,
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Figure 1 . a. Sequentially activated time cells in lPFC encode time conjunctively with
stimulus identity. The three heatmaps each show the response of every unit classified as a time
cell. The heatmap on the left (“Best category”) shows the response of each unit to the category
that caused the highest response for that unit, sorted according to the units estimated time of peak
activity. The second column (“Same category set”) shows the heatmap for the same units, but for
the other category from the same category set as that unit’s “Best category.” For instance, if a
unit responded the most on trials in which the sample stimulus was chosen from the cat category,
then that units response to cat trials would go in the first column and its response to dog trials
would go in the second column. The third column shows the response of each unit to trials on which
the sample stimulus was from the other category set. Continuing with our example, a unit whose
best category was cat would have its response to car trials in the third column. The scale of the
colormap is the same for all three plots and it is normalized for each unit such that red represents
the unit’s highest average firing rate and blue represents its lowest average firing rate across time
bins. b. Compression of the time axis is approximately logarithmic. Same data as in a, but
with time shown on a logarithmic-scale (note that the axes are also trimmed to avoid edge effects).
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Cromer, et al., in press). Moreover, there is nothing in the specification of a reservoir
computing model that requires the temporal compression to be logarithmic. The results
from (Tiganj, Cromer, et al., in press) suggest that the receptive fields were compact in the
2D space spanned with time and stimulus identity. Thus, time and stimulus identity were
represented as continuous variables through a conjunctive (mixed selective) neural code.
This is a very powerful representation because simple linear associations are sufficient to
learn specific temporal relationships (Rigotti et al., 2013; Fusi, Miller, & Rigotti, 2016).
Behavioral evidence for a supported timeline
In the preceding section we saw that even in the absence of an explicit task demand to
encode time, neurons in the macaque lPFC were sequentially activated, enabling reconstruc-
tion of temporal information. Notably, with the passage of time the temporal resolution of
the representation became less accurate. This parallels the behavioral recency effect which
is manifest as a reduction in the accuracy and an increase in response times for events that
are further in the past. The recency effect is observed in all of the major memory paradigms
and has similar properties over a range of time scales from a few hundred milliseconds up to
at least tens of minutes (Monsell, 1978; Glenberg et al., 1980; Neath, 1993; Standing, 1973;
Shepard & Chang, 1963; Moreton & Ward, 2010). The existence of a recency effect and its
persistence over a range of time scales follow naturally if behavioral memory performance
is extracted from a scale-invariant temporal representation of the past.
Cognitive psychologists considering how memory is accessed have proposed scanning
models to describe the cognitive processes supporting a range of memory tasks. In visual
scanning, people direct their gaze along a display to find a particular piece of informa-
tion (e.g., Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Scanning models assume that an analogous process
operates in memory (Sternberg, 1966; Hacker, 1980). Continuing the metaphor to vision,
memory contains a store of information about many events that have been experienced in
the past. However, to access the information from this memory store in enough detail,
attention must be focused on a subset of the information in this memory store at a given
time. Many scanning models assume that the information in the memory store is organized.
For instance, in many scanning models remembered items are stored along a sequentially
organized timeline. If memory is organized, then scanning models imply that the time to
access a particular memory can reveal the organization of the memory store.
In the short-term JOR task (Hacker, 1980; Muter, 1979) participants are asked to make
judgments about the relative recency1 of two probe items. In this task, the participants
are rapidly presented with a list of consonants with one letter every 180 ms. At the end
of the list, participants are presented with two probes from the list and asked to indicate
which of the two items was presented more recently. For instance in Figure 2a, the probes
are g and t and the correct answer is g. The key finding is that the correct response time
to make a correct response depends only on the recency of the more recent probe. That is
after learning the list in Figure 2a, correct response time would be slower if g was replaced
as a probe with q, but would not be affected if t was replaced as a probe with y (Fig. 2b,
1In this task time and recency are confounded. Prior work using behavioral tasks (Brown, Vousden, &
McCormack, 2009; Brown, Morin, & Lewandowsky, 2006; Hintzman, 2004) and electrophysiology (Kraus,
Robinson, White, Eichenbaum, & Hasselmo, 2013) has shown that both temporal and ordinal information
is stored in the brain.




























































Figure 2 . Behavioral results from the short-term judgment of recency (JOR)
task are consistent with backward scanning along a logarithmically-compressed
timeline. a. The participants are shown a list of letters followed by a probe containing
two letters from the list. The participants are required to choose the more recent of the two
probe items. b. Empirical results in the JOR task. The response time for correct JORs is
shown as a function of the more remote (less recent) probe. Different lines correspond to
different recencies of the more recent probe. The darkest line corresponds to trials where
the last item in the list was the more recent probe; successively lighter lines correspond
to trials when the more recent probe was further in the past. The separation between the
lines shows that correct RT depends strongly on the lag to the more recent probe (the
separation between the lines), consistent with a backward scanning model. The flatness
of each of the lines shows that the recency of the more remote (less recent) probe does
not affect RT. c. The median RT for selected probe as a function of its recency. The RT
decreases sublinearly with recency (note the scaling of the x axis), as would be predicted if
the timeline is compressed.
Singh & Howard, 2017). This finding is as one would expect from a serial self-terminating
backward scanning model.
Suppose that the participant sequentially compares the two probes to the contents of
memory, stopping the search when one of the probes matches the information found in that
region of the memory store. Moreover, suppose that memory is organized like a timeline
and that the search begins at the present and proceeds towards the past. Because the search
begins at the present and proceeds towards the past, it should take less time to find more
recent probes. Because the search terminates when a match is found, the time necessary
for a successful search for the more recent probe should not depend on the recency of the
more remote (less recent) probe. This is just the result that is found experimentally.
If response times in the JOR task reflect the amount of “distance traversed” along
the timeline, then the rate at which RT increases as the selected probe is chosen further
and further into the past gives a measure of the organization of the temporal axis. The
logarithmic compression in the neural data suggests that the one would expect a logarithmic
compression in the reaction time data. Although it is difficult to argue specifically for a
logarithmic compression, there is no question that the increase in RT is sublinear as the
most recent probe recedes into the past (Figure 2c). Prior modeling work has shown that
the framework used in the proposed model can account for both accuracy and response
times (Howard et al., 2015). While response times do not vary as a function of the more
remote probe, accuracy shows a distance effect. In a self terminating scanning model, more
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remote items are missed at a higher rate than more recent items and the number of incorrect
responses depends on contributions to the search from the less recent lags.
The finding of scanning along a logarithmic temporal axis in short-term JOR aligns with
a number of other findings from long-term memory. For instance, in the numerical JOR
task, participants report a numerical estimate of the recency of a probe stimulus. Numerical
JORs are not a linear function of objective recency. Rather, they approximate a logarithmic
function of actual recency (Hinrichs & Buschke, 1968; Hinrichs, 1970). Moreover, when
participants are asked to judge the recency of a probe that has been presented multiple times,
their judgments go up like the logarithm of the recency of the most recent presentation, but
depend only weakly on the existence of an earlier presentation (Hintzman, 2010). These and
other findings can be addressed with cognitive models based on a logarithmically-compressed
representation of the past (Howard et al., 2015).
The challenge of decoding what and when in working memory
The previous section showed behavioral evidence that short-term human JOR perfor-
mance relies on backward scanning of a logarithmically-compressed timeline. Earlier we
saw that neural representations in a macaque working memory task appeared to construct
a logarithmically-compressed timeline. It is of course possible that one has nothing to do
with the other. Perhaps the behavioral evidence is actually generated by a different cogni-
tive model. Perhaps the dislocation between species and/or the methodological differences
between the behavioral tasks have conspired to create an illusion of a connection where
none exists. Here we argue that taking the cognitive model for backward scanning seriously
requires a neural representation very much like that observed in the macaque working mem-
ory task and argues against many possible representations of what and when information
that would be subsumed under the more general framework of reservoir computing.
Consider the computational challenge of implementing a backward self-terminating
search model neurally. The backward scanning model requires that we can query the con-
tent available at different times. That is, one must be able to specify a when and retrieve
information about the what. This places a strong constraint on the organization of the
memory store. It is not sufficient that the store contains information about what happened
when, but also that the information about different times can be separately queried. More-
over, because at most a few seconds intervene between presentation of a novel list and the
JOR test, it is difficult to reconcile successful performance on this task with models that
require extensive training to develop a decoder. It is known that humans can perform the
JOR task with unfamiliar pictures (Hintzman, 2005). If a decoder for what happened when
must be learned, this immediately raises the question of how the training signal should be
generated. It is circular to assume that the training signal contains information about what
happened when, i.e. in order to learn what happened when one starts with information
about what happened when. Moreover, because techniques for learning via gradient de-
scent are typically slow, requiring many trials to successfully learn, there is the additional
technical challenge of generating a decoder that can be used for unfamiliar pictures.
Figure 3 provides a schematic depiction of the properties that would be necessary to
account for this set of findings. The ability to separately decode both identity and temporal
information follows from a linear system in which each possible stimulus triggers a sequence
of activity that is not affected by subsequent stimulus presentations. In this way each
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Figure 3 . Conjunctive representation of what happened when. Each horizontal strip shows
the activation of a different set of units triggered by each of several possible stimuli. The pattern of
activation across the units is logarithmically compressed such that units peaking further in the past
(on the left of the figure) have wider temporal fields (as in Fig. 1). This figure shows the state of
the representation after presenting the list from Fig. 2a at a constant rate. Note that each stimulus
shows the same width across units. The temporal compression can be seen by noting that the
location of the peaks across cells overlap more for stimuli further in the past. If scanning proceeds
at a constant rate in cell space, the time to find a target depends on the logarithm of its recency as
found in the behavioral data.
unit is identified with a single time point in the past and a projection from the stimulus
space.2 However, in order to rapidly decode the recency of arbitrary stimuli appearing in
arbitrary sequences it is necessary that the response of the neurons coding for the history
is available in a form that does not require learning a different decoder for each time point.
In the case of the proposed model, the information is encoded through a set of leaky
integrators and decoded through a linear transformation that gives rise to a logarithmically-
compressed sequential activation constituting a timeline. Because there is no mixing of
stimulus dimensions through the stages of the network and the same form of stimulus
coding is respected at each point of the timeline, there is no need to learn a sequence-
specific decoder.
2In Figure 3 the mapping from stimulus space to the units is “localist” for clarity such that each unit
responds only to a single stimulus. In general, this is not necessary.
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Discussion
The results reviewed in this paper are perfectly consistent with a dynamic view of work-
ing memory (Stokes, 2015; Spaak et al., 2017) and a subset of reservoir computing models.
However, they imply a coding scheme more specific than general reservoir computing or
recurrent network models.
First, the results here suggest that time in the working memory representation is loga-
rithmically compressed. Logarithmic compression provides a natural implementation of the
Weber-Fechner law and is optimal in the sense that it enables comparable amount of infor-
mation to be extracted from the past at different scales of resolution (Howard & Shankar, in
press). Logarithmic compression requires a system that is scale-invariant. Scale-invariance
is very difficult to implement in a linear chain of neurons (Goldman, 2009; Liu, Tiganj,
Hasselmo, & Howard, In revision). In the context of reservoir computing, scale-invariance
implies a broad and specific spectrum of eigenvalues of the dynamics of the system. Log-
arithmic compression implies that the spectrum of eigenvalues gives a distribution of time
constants τ that goes down like τ−1. The long tail of this power law distribution requires
that the system has some very long time constants. It is possible that these time constants
are not the consequence of recurrent connections but that they result from very slow in-
trinsic properties of individual neurons (Egorov et al., 2002; Fransén, Tahvildari, Egorov,
Hasselmo, & Alonso, 2006; Tiganj, Hasselmo, & Howard, 2015).
Second, in order for the time decoder to be extensible to novel stimuli and novel lists,
the dynamics of the system must be linear (or nearly so). In a linear system, the state of
the network can be expressed as a sum of the previously-presented stimuli. This means that
the information about whether or not a particular stimulus was presented at a particular
time can be decoupled from the information carried about other stimuli. This property is
extremely useful in developing models of working memory in which arbitrary information
can be queried from novel temporal sequences.
Both of these properties are straightforward to implement in a computational model
based on the Laplace transform (Shankar & Howard, 2012, 2013). Intuitively, the set of
cells coding the Laplace transform holds information about the past, but in a way that is
distributed across all of the cells. Unlike a vector space representation, any individual cell
does not carry unique identifiable information about the past. However, a subset of cells
with nearby time constants uniquely codes for the history at a corresponding point in the
past. By including a wide range of time constants in the set of cells coding for the Laplace
transform, one can trace out the entire timeline of the past. This model meets the formal
requirements for a reservoir computer and a liquid state machine. However, it is a linear
system. Moreover because the different time scales decouple from one another (unlike in a
linear chain), the problem of constructing a spectrum of time constants that goes like τ−1
can be addressed using very general physical principles (Amir, Oreg, & Imry, 2012). This
formal approach is beyond the scope of the current paper, but it has been applied to a
range of problems in neuroscience (Howard et al., 2014; Howard & Eichenbaum, 2013) and
cognitive psychology (Howard et al., 2015).
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Open questions
The hypothesis advanced here—that working memory is constructed from a linear sys-
tem with logarithmic time compression—makes a number of testable predictions, both
neurophysiologically and behaviorally.
Although there is good evidence for a logarithmic temporal scale in behavior (e.g.,
Hinrichs & Buschke, 1968) the quantitative evidence for logarithmic compression of time
has not been established quantitatively in neurophysiologically. That is, although there is
abundant evidence that time cells in a range of brain regions and tasks are compressed (e.g.,
Mello et al., 2015; Salz et al., 2016; Jin et al., 2009; Tiganj, Shankar, & Howard, 2017), it
has not been quantitatively established that this compression is logarithmic.
A logarithmically compressed timeline could be an important part of neural mechanism
needed for performing the JOR task. However, to fully describe the neural underpinnings
of the JOR task it is necessary to explain how the compressed timeline can be sequentially
scanned and how the output of that scanning can be used to accumulate evidence for each
presented probe. This problem is conceptually similar to the problem of visual attention,
where subjects sequentially scan the visual space (Howard, in press). While details of such a
circuit remain outside of the scope of this review, we speculate that the sequential scanning
could be implemented with the same type of circuit as the compressed memory itself. If the
activity of a set of neurons can be used to gate the output of the timeline, then attention
to a particular point in the past amounts to setting the gate to the corresponding time
cells. Sequentially scanning along the past amounts to sequentially moving the location of
this gate. In order to account for response times, one would allow this gated output from
the timeline to provide input to an evidence accumulating circuit (Ratcliff, 1978; Usher &
McClelland, 2001).
The mathematics of the computational model can generate a scale-invariant timeline
extending arbitrarily far into the past. Neural constraints would certainly limit the extent
of such a timeline in practice. Behavioral evidence suggests scale-invariance in memory
for at least tens of minutes (Howard, Youker, & Venkatadass, 2008). It remains unclear
whether time cells can support the memory representation for that long. Although existing
neural recordings have measured time cell sequences extending at least a minute (Bolkan
et al., 2017; Mello et al., 2015), existing neural data do not address longer time scales.
However, multiple studies have reported gradual changes in neural activity across spectrum
of timescales, from minutes to days (Manns, Howard, & Eichenbaum, 2007; Mankin, Diehl,
Sparks, Leutgeb, & Leutgeb, 2015; Rashid et al., 2016; Cai et al., 2016; Mau et al., Accepted
pending minor revisions). It is possible that those very slow changes reflect sequentially
activiting time cells over much longer time scales than have thus been observed.
Conclusions
We reviewed recent neurophysiological and behavioral evidence that suggests that the
representations supporting working memory performance have a very specific form. Our
hypothesis is that sets of neurons represent what happened when in a conjunctive manner
with logarithmic compression of the time axis. This hypothesis implies a specific form of
a dynamic working memory representation that is a subset of the more general mathe-
matical framework of reservoir computing. Rapid expression of arbitrary decoders requires
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linear dynamics. Logarithmic compression requires that the dynamics are scale-invariant.
Both of these properties are satisfied by a recent proposal for constructing a scale-invariant
representation of a temporal history.
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